On 3 April this year, there was an international outcry when the Chinese artist and activist Ai Weiwei was arrested on charges of alleged “economic crimes”.
London’s Tate Modern placed a large sign on its building demanding that China “Release Ai Weiwei”. The artist was eventually freed on 22 June.
So is everything OK now? Martin Roth, director of the Victoria and Albert Museum, London, did not think so. He was quoted in Die Zeit saying that Ai is so popular only “because he is constantly pounding the table”.
But surely the issue of cultural rights should amount to more than campaigns for the release from jail of high-profile artists?
International law is unequivocal in including cultural rights as an essential component in the indivisible body of human rights. Many states, including ours, are signatories to the legally binding 1966 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), but have largely ignored its requirement to take steps to achieve full realisation of the cultural rights of their citizens.
What, then, are cultural rights? Academic and former Unesco deputy director general Rodolfo Stavenhagen has identified three broad concepts of culture embodied in international and inter-governmental frameworks. The first is culture as capital – the accumulated material heritage of mankind, to which people should have basic access.
The second concept is culture as creativity, which is usually assumed to apply to leading artists. Stavenhagen’s third concept is culture as a total way of life – often assumed to be the sum total of the material and spiritual activities of indigenous peoples.
In practice these definitions ascribe a passive role to citizens in plural democratic societies. A leading US theorist of human rights, Henry Shue, says that to be effective, rights must be founded on meaningful social participation.
Public institutions have a duty to work actively to eliminate inequality of participation. They must also give citizens the opportunity to influence strategies and outcomes. These responsibilities apply as much to their international projects as those carried out at home.
One might expect cultural institutions to press for implementation of CESCR, and encourage the public to demand their cultural rights, but, strangely, they have been silent – fearful, perhaps, that they might be obliged to divert resources from other institutional priorities.
The arrest of Ai might have stimulated critical reflection by the sector on social participation and the realisation of cultural rights. Instead, the public was offered not thought, but feel-good gestures that have passed without trace.
London’s Tate Modern placed a large sign on its building demanding that China “Release Ai Weiwei”. The artist was eventually freed on 22 June.
So is everything OK now? Martin Roth, director of the Victoria and Albert Museum, London, did not think so. He was quoted in Die Zeit saying that Ai is so popular only “because he is constantly pounding the table”.
But surely the issue of cultural rights should amount to more than campaigns for the release from jail of high-profile artists?
International law is unequivocal in including cultural rights as an essential component in the indivisible body of human rights. Many states, including ours, are signatories to the legally binding 1966 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), but have largely ignored its requirement to take steps to achieve full realisation of the cultural rights of their citizens.
What, then, are cultural rights? Academic and former Unesco deputy director general Rodolfo Stavenhagen has identified three broad concepts of culture embodied in international and inter-governmental frameworks. The first is culture as capital – the accumulated material heritage of mankind, to which people should have basic access.
The second concept is culture as creativity, which is usually assumed to apply to leading artists. Stavenhagen’s third concept is culture as a total way of life – often assumed to be the sum total of the material and spiritual activities of indigenous peoples.
In practice these definitions ascribe a passive role to citizens in plural democratic societies. A leading US theorist of human rights, Henry Shue, says that to be effective, rights must be founded on meaningful social participation.
Public institutions have a duty to work actively to eliminate inequality of participation. They must also give citizens the opportunity to influence strategies and outcomes. These responsibilities apply as much to their international projects as those carried out at home.
One might expect cultural institutions to press for implementation of CESCR, and encourage the public to demand their cultural rights, but, strangely, they have been silent – fearful, perhaps, that they might be obliged to divert resources from other institutional priorities.
The arrest of Ai might have stimulated critical reflection by the sector on social participation and the realisation of cultural rights. Instead, the public was offered not thought, but feel-good gestures that have passed without trace.
